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Increased use of annual payments to land managers for ecological outcomes indicates a growing23
interest in exploring the potential of this approach. In this viewpoint, we drew on the experiences of24
all schemes paying for biodiversity outcomes/results on agricultural land operating in the EU and25
EFTA countries with the aim of reviewing the decisive elements of the schemes’ design and26
implementation as well as the challenges and opportunities of adopting a results-based approach.27
We analysed the characteristics of results-based schemes using evidence from peer-reviewed28
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literature, technical reports, scheme practitioners and experts in agri-environment-climate policy.29
We developed a typology of the schemes and explored critical issues influencing the feasibility and30
performance of results-based schemes. The evidence to date shows that there are at least 1131
advantages to the results-based approach not found in management-based schemes with similar32
objectives, dealing with environmental efficiency, farmers’ participation and development of local33
biodiversity-based projects. Although results-based approaches have specific challenges at every34
stage of design and implementation, for many of these the existing schemes provide potential35
solutions. There is also some apprehension about trying a results-based approach in Mediterranean,36
central and eastern EU Member States. We conclude that there is clear potential to expand the37
approach in the European Union for the Rural Development programming period for 2021–2028.38
Nevertheless, evidence is needed about the approach’s efficiency in delivering conservation39
outcomes in the long term, its additionality, impact on the knowledge and attitudes of land40
managers and society at large, development of ways of rewarding the achievement of actual results,41
as well as its potential for stimulating innovative grassroots solutions.42
43
1. Introduction44
In the words of McIntyre et al. (1992), the ‘struggle to maintain biodiversity is going to be won or45
lost in agricultural systems’. For terrestrial systems globally, agricultural expansion remains the46
most prominent threat, while in Europe, increased specialization and intensification, and47
abandonment of high nature value (HNV) farmland (Oppermann et al. 2012) threaten biodiversity48
on farmland (Stoate et al., 2009; Poláková et al. 2011). As a result, a particularly high proportion of49
semi-natural habitats, and associated species, that are dependent on HNV farming systems and are50
protected under the Habitats Directive have an unfavourable conservation status (EEA, 2015).51
Meaningful engagement of farmers remains the key to the fate of biodiversity in the long term (de52
Snoo et al. 2012).53
54
In the European Union (EU), by far the largest source of funding for practical nature conservation is55
being delivered through the agri-environment-climate schemes (AES) implemented under the56
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Poláková et al. 2011). A review of monitoring evidence57
suggests that most AES lead to biodiversity benefits, but the performance of some has been58
unsatisfactory (Batáry et al. 2015). The prescriptive nature of the AES, inflexible payment59
conditions, poor targeting, and a low priority put on actual results have been identified as some of60
3
3
the key reasons for poor effectiveness (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011; Batáry et al. 2015). New61
approaches to delivering biodiversity objectives on farmland that encourage farmers to actively62
engage with the goals of environmental management are needed alongside the existing ones. These63
include support to voluntary non-monetary activities (Santangeli et al. 2016) and making payments64
conditional on delivering ecological results (Zabel and Roe, 2009; Burton and Schwarz, 2013; Reed65
et al., 2014).66
67
Making public or private payments conditional on the delivery of results, that is ‘ecological goods68
and services’, has been actively explored under the framework of payments for ecosystem services69
(Gerowitt et al., 2003). The possibilities for integrating the ecosystem services approach into AES70
have recently been emphasized, alongside discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of this type71
of approach (Meyer et al., 2016; Reed et al., 2014; Matzdorf and Meyer, 2014). The focus on72
outcomes that is implied in such payments makes the process of design and implementation reliant73
on adaptive management and the capacity of land managers for innovation. This, in turn, requires74
the development of multi-party governance systems and experiment-driven environmental policy75
(Hiedanpää and Borgström, 2014). Refining policy tools and delivery requires a cultural change in76
the way that farmers engage with policy on the ground involving, inter alia, clearer goals and results77
orientation (Buckwell et al., 2017). In their review Burton and Schwarz (2013), made a first attempt78
of synthesizing evidence from the result-oriented schemes (12 at a time) and focused at the cultural79
and social change these may promote and require. The situation in the field progressed rapidly since80
then.81
In this viewpoint we focus on the results-based payment (RBP) approach applied specifically to82
biodiversity on agricultural land across Europe, including extensive livestock systems (e.g. reindeer83
herding in forest-tundra areas of Lapland) and other HNV farmland (e.g. traditional orchards). We84
present a typology of the existing schemes that remunerate land-managers, mostly farmers, for85
biodiversity outcomes in the EU and European Free Trade Association countries (Norway and86
Switzerland), explore critical issues influencing the feasibility of the approach in the design and87
implementation stages, and discuss the opportunities and challenges of the approach. The viewpoint88
largely draws on work commissioned by the European Commission to review the advantages and89
challenges of adopting the RBP approach for the protection and enhancement of biodiversity (for90
full report see Allen et al. 2014).91
As part of the study, we analysed the characteristics of all RBP schemes operating in Europe92
(within and outside AES agreements) and 20 responses from questionnaires distributed to key93
4
4
practitioners involved in the design and implementation of these RBP schemes in 17 countries.94
Discussions with over 50 key experts in the field of agri-environment-climate policy and ecological95
indicators also aided the interpretation of the above evidence. Drawing from insights in the96
literature on participatory and experimental policy and on payments for ecosystem services, we97
discuss some of the opportunities and challenges of the RBP approach and suggest ideas for98
essential future research and policy development.99
2. Implementation of payment-by-results approach in Europe100
Though a multitude of schemes that involve payments for ecological services exist worldwide, there101
is no single agreed definition of what constitutes a ‘results-based payment scheme’ for biodiversity102
(other terms used are ‘payment by results’, ‘outcome focused’, ‘performance payment’, see Burton103
and Schwarz, 2013). We reviewed all schemes that, to varying degrees, financially reward or104
remunerate land managers for delivering verifiable biodiversity achievements on agricultural land.105
There is a range of approaches to delivering biodiversity objectives, from conventional106
management-based approaches to those that reward only the results irrespective of the management107
used. Despite the diversity of solutions, a pattern emerged relating to the extent to which the108
schemes’ ‘payment’ and ‘control’ mechanisms are dependent on a priori specified biodiversity109
outcomes. Based on this pattern, we constructed a typology of the schemes (Table 1). At the time of110
the survey, there were only five schemes in Europe that paid according to the specified biodiversity111
results, prescribed no management interventions and allowed recipients of payments the complete112
flexibility to decide on management (i.e. pure results-based schemes, also Supplement Table A.1).113
Most of the RBP schemes were of the ‘hybrid’ type, in which certain management conditions were114
applied even if the payments were wholly dependent on results. We further discovered that the115




The first experiments with the RBP approach were carried out in the early 1990s using regional or120
national funding (Figure 1; Supplement Table A.1), and new schemes were introduced steadily in121
the following decades (Figure 1). Various national, regional, and provincial government sources,122
national park funds and private funding were used in the piloting stages, after which many of the123
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schemes were integrated into CAP-funded agri-environment programmes (or the equivalent in124
Switzerland). These additional funding sources are still used in several cases. The majority of RBP125
schemes operate in Northern and Western European countries. Many schemes have been126
established as trials for specific localities. These focus on specific biodiversity objectives within the127
defined areas and, hence, the implementation scales remain relatively small in terms of area covered128
and number of farmers involved. Additionally, there are well-established schemes covering129
thousands of hectares and involving thousands of payment recipients (e.g., Suvantola, 2013; Zabel130
and Holm-Müller, 2008; Fleury et al., 2015; Russi et al. 2016). Several pilot projects or schemes131
have been discontinued or superseded by new approaches (for example, in The Netherlands, trial132
payments to farmers per clutch of meadow birds by Meadow Bird Agreements scheme for farmer133
collectives; Table A.1). In addition, a suite of new pilots is currently underway (Supplement Table134
A.1) in four countries.135
Concurrently with the increase in the number of RBP schemes, there is a growing body of peer-136
reviewed publications from research focused on the schemes (Figure 1). About half of them come137
from Germany, which has the highest number of federal government schemes and the longest138
experience with the approach. Most studies focus exclusively on the development and testing of139
ecological indicators and the schemes’ performance in delivering ecological outcomes (e.g. Wittig140
et al., 2006; Bertke et al., 2008; Matzdorf et al. 2008; Höft et al. 2010; Kaiser et al, 2010). A141
handful of studies focus on the attitudes of recipients of payments to the new approach (e.g. Zabel142
and Holm-Müller, 2008; Schroeder et al. 2013), or on its economics (e.g. Hasund, 2013). In two143
countries research integrated ecological, social and economic assessments (e.g. Johst et al. 2002;144
Klimek et al. 2008; Haaren and Bathke, 2008; Magda et al. 2015; Russi et al., 2016). Valuable145
insights have been obtained from a re-assessment of the schemes’ results and processes after146




The most common objective of the existing RBP schemes in Europe is the maintenance of semi-151
natural grassland communities. There are also RBP schemes for traditional orchards and vineyards,152
as well as for animal species of EU and national conservation interest (e.g. protection of breeding153
birds from farming operations, and for threatened raptors and carnivores) (Supplement Table A.1).154
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Numerous schemes offer headage payments for endangered native breeds of livestock, and area-155
based payments for endangered native crop varieties. While such schemes are results-based in their156
design, they represent a distinct category of payment that we do not consider here. These and157
payments for the number of trees in traditional orchards in most German federal states are excluded158
from Figure 1.159
160
3. Ensuring effective design of results-based schemes161
Most of the issues that are critical to the design of a successful RBP are common to all schemes162
promoting environmental land management (Moxey and White, 2014). Among these are the skills163
and capacity of the authorities, administrative costs, the quality of the IT support systems, and164
attitudinal factors (e.g. Prager and Posthumus, 2010; Young et al., 2013). Differences lie in the165
particular skills and attitudes that are needed. Three issues appear to be particularly critical to the166
success of schemes that pay for results. These are: i) clearly defined environmental objectives, ii)167
suitable indicators of these objectives, on which the result payments are based, and iii) socio-168
economic context.169
The appropriateness of an RBP scheme will depend firstly on the definition of clear biodiversity170
objectives based on the most accurate and up-to-date data. Existing schemes mainly target the171
maintenance of threatened habitats (e.g. species-rich meadows) and species (e.g. Golden Eagle172
Aquila chrysaetos) rather than common farmland biodiversity (Supplement Table A.1) since their173
ecological requirements are well understood, as are the impacts on them of agricultural174
management. In general, RBP schemes are better suited to maintaining existing habitats that are in175
good ecological condition (where the farmers can draw on their experience in managing the habitat)176
rather than the restoration or re-creation of habitats (where conservation measures unfamiliar to the177
farmer may be required).178
Secondly, there is a consensus that the existence of reliable indicators of the specified biodiversity179
objective is the most important practical consideration, since presence of the indicators is the basis180
for verification to release the payment. Burton and Schwarz (2013) argue that the success or failure181
of schemes in delivering their ecological results largely rests on the quality of the result indicators.182
In addition to the general criteria for a biodiversity indicator (e.g. Feest, 2013), the results indicators183
in RBP schemes on farmland should: i) not be easily achievable by means other than agricultural184
management, ii) be understandable and linked clearly to biodiversity objectives that are acceptable185
7
7
to land managers and paying agency representatives (i.e. not seen as ‘bad farming’), and iii) be186
easily measurable following initial training (reviewed in Allen et al. (2014)). Designing an RBP187
scheme is justified only if potentially suitable biodiversity result indicators can be identified, which188
may not be possible for all biodiversity objectives or locations.189
Thirdly, specific socio-economic factors need to be taken into account. These include stakeholder190
attitudes to innovation and risk taking, the existence of a culture of trust between the different191
actors, and accountability levels. Other important socio-economic factors, such as the capacity of192
the authorities and compatibility with other national policy regulations, are common to any payment193
scheme. Meyer et al. (2016) demonstrated that successful AES based on ecosystem service delivery194




We identified the essential steps for each stage of the life cycle of RBP approach (Box 1). At every199
stage, the approach has specific challenges for design and implementation and for many of these,200
the existing schemes provide potential solutions. Several questionnaire respondents in Greece,201
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovakia and the UK perceived the RBP approach to be incompatible with202
the EU and/or WTO rules on calculating payments and their subsequent control and verification.203
This is contrary to the evidence (Hasund and Johansson, 2016; Russi et al., 2016): the payment204
level in most RBS schemes, like that of many management-based schemes, is determined in205
accordance with WTO rules. This means that the payment rate is calculated on the opportunity costs206
of the management that is considered most likely to be required to achieve the results, and not on a207
valuation of the results as such. RBP schemes are frequently built upon or complement existing208
AES and use the existing administrative infrastructure.209
‘Tuning’ the scheme is best achieved during its piloting or over several years of scheme210
implementation (e.g. the process of gradual development of MEKA scheme in Germany in Russi et211
al., 2016; or the scheme for birds breeding in meadows in The Netherlands in Allen et al., 2014, p.212
55, also Verhulst et al., 2007), which is true for any novel method of policy delivery (cf. Meyer et213
al., 2016; Radley, 2005). Options for indicators range from the numbers of a single species to a214
composite indicator with species numbers and habitat attributes (e.g. DAFF, 2016 in Ireland). The215
most important consideration is to ensure that the indicator thresholds do not reward the216
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deterioration of the most biodiverse sites. This can be prevented by having multiple indicator217
thresholds (as in Russi et al., 2016). In hybrid RBP schemes, the payments are dependent on some218
management prescriptions that aim to maintain baseline conditions. Hybrid schemes may also be219
required because not all biodiversity aims can be practically measured through indicators. However,220
just as with the management-based payments, the owners of the sites with the highest biodiversity221
may still not receive a sufficient incentive for maintaining exceptional biodiversity, if the threshold222
is determined by the average situation.223
Setting an appropriate payment level so that it reflects the full cost of achieving the desired224
outcomes, including time spent on training and monitoring of ecological results by farmers, while225
also keeping the schemes simple and cost-effective is a challenge (Cooper et al., 2009) that can be226
resolved only through experimentation. The participation risk for newcomers to the scheme can be227
reduced by setting fairly easy entry conditions with an increasing demand for a higher target and228
higher payments later (Schroder et al., 2013). Ways of calculating payments vary from a single229
bonus payment for the results additional to the baseline payment for management to an iterative230
process of auctioning (see Allen et al., 2014 for the technical information). As with the231
management-based AES payments, sustaining the participation level requires that remuneration232
levels respond to the shifting opportunity costs of participating in the biodiversity scheme (Russi et233
al., 2016). Practice shows that some AES, regardless of their nature, are not widely implemented if234
the payment rates do not reflect the land managers’ perceived costs, including time spent on the235
application process and controls.236
Ideally, the process of verifying result indicators should be such that the land managers can237
understand and carry it out themselves. This is considered valuable regardless of whether the238
managers are required to conduct their own verification of achieved ecological results, because it239
allows assessment of one’s performance and facilitates adaptive management (e.g. Fleury et al.,240
2015; Russi et al., 2016). Most farmers welcome a chance to learn more about the features they are241
managing regardless of the payment structure (Fleury et al., 2015; Birge et al., 2017). Although242
verification approaches vary among the schemes, the involvement of several interest groups –243
biologists, farmers or herders, agronomists, NGOs – in their development and testing is pinpointed244
as a basis for the scheme success (e.g., Fleury et al., 2015; Matzdorf et al., 2014). This can be245
facilitated by involving voluntary organisations (e.g., environmental and community groups), which246
can help fine-tune the scheme in line with principles of adaptive co-management as illustrated by247
landscape stewardship initiatives in Europe (García-Martín et al., 2016).248
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Attracting wider public attention to the innovative RBP schemes was an important part of249
implementation in France and served as an additional reward instrument (Fleury et al., 2015).250
Though it may not essential for the scheme’s instigation, it may render long-term support in running251
and enlarging the scheme. Regardless of their other attributes, all the schemes that were reviewed252
demonstrated the need to keep things as simple as possible whilst achieving the desired biodiversity253
outcome and recognising the needs of all the key interest groups.254
255
4. Opportunities and challenges256
Most of the potential advantages of the RBP approach for both the farmer and for the managing257
authority compared to management-based schemes with similar objectives have been verified in the258
literature (Table 2) and by experts. The majority of the respondents confirmed that uptake of the259
RBP options has increased over time as land managers become more familiar with the new260
approach (see also Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Some even considered the element of risk261
associated with RBP schemes was mentioned as positive. Farmers can get a great sense of pride262
from overcoming adversity, while management-based payments may not be engaging (e.g. an263
interesting challenge) and are, instead, viewed as a bureaucratic nuisance (Sligo and Massey, 2007).264
Integration of socio-economic co-benefits may increase uptake and promote long-term attitudinal265
change (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011): for example, in France, biodiversity aims are combined266
with agronomic ones, which reinforces the production role of the farmer and results in a collective267
learning process for all participants and increases public consensus on management objectives268




We also identified circumstances where a well-designed and targeted management-based approach273
is likely to be more appropriate than a RBP one for the same environmental objective. Such274
situations particularly arise when: i) it is impossible to develop reliable indicators and methods of275
measuring them within reasonable costs, ii) achieving a measurable outcome takes an unreasonable276
length of time and delays the payment to the land manager (high concern for farmers), iii) the277
managing authority has no access to the information and expertise needed to set up and run a RBP278
scheme (high concern for authorities); or iv) the farming community is unwilling to accept a RBP279
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approach. For example, there is a clear apprehension about initiating the RBP approach in280
Mediterranean, central and eastern EU Member States. The reasons mentioned were their recent281
predominant command-control culture and a lack of trust between the authorities and farmers (see282
also Prazan and Theesfelt, 2014). More clarity in the objectives behind the transactions between the283
state and farmer for the AES may be an important tool for building trust in the policy.284
Devising an appropriate system for results verification has been cited as a critical difficulty in the285
adoption or extension of RBP schemes. While the high administrative costs of the RBP scheme in286
Ireland are regarded as a barrier to scaling up the scheme, Russi et al. (2016) provided evidence of287
low transaction costs and cost-efficient ways of verifying results in a long-running RBP scheme in288
Germany. Some costs of scheme establishment may be high in the early years and then decline (see289
also Schwarz et al., 2008). Competitive bidding for outcomes, as opposed to fixed-price payments,290
within the RBP approach may provide new opportunities in tackling over- and under-compensation291
for delivering the results (e.g. Klimek et al., 2008). However, in the set-up of tendering processes, a292
trade-off between the achievement of environmental outcomes and the budgetary costs usually leads293
the public agency to compromise solutions (Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2016).294
It is not uncommon that management-based AES are designed to facilitate the reliable distribution295
of funds to farmers and to reduce running costs, with the major indicator of success being296
participation rates rather than actual environmental benefits (Keenleyside et al., 2011). This may be297
a “false economy” (Reed et al., 2014). Running costs may be lower, but there is a risk that the298
payments to farmers will not achieve any appreciable environmental benefit (Armsworth et al.,299
2012). Management based schemes may also have poor additionality: for example, continuing to300
provide payments to farmers even when the targeted outcome is no longer being achieved. Both301
approaches risk providing payments for outcomes that would have happened anyway with no added302
value to the existing situation (Russi et al. 2016). Unfortunately, little is known about the303
biodiversity cost-effectiveness of management-based AES, even if they have been running for304
decades.305
In making payments dependent on the achievement of results, the RBP approach risks provoking306
disputes over whether or not those results have actually been achieved. A robust system of dispute307
resolution that is fair to both sides helps to increase farmers’ confidence in the RBP schemes. In308
Ireland, farmers are not only given training in the assessment that determines payment levels but309
also are encouraged to challenge the scores given by the independent assessors (J. Moran, IT Sligo,310
pers. comm.). However, the close involvement of farmers may lead to the manipulation of baselines311
11
11
and thresholds on the land that may be enrolled in the scheme in ways that undermine312
environmental additionality (Zabel and Roe, 2009; Burton and Schwarz, 2013).313
A major challenge faced by the RBP approach is, thus, enhancing the collaboration and trust among314
the parties, which would allow for fair and low-cost verification of the results, effective conflict315
resolution mechanisms, and experimentation with management for optimal delivery of results.316
Schemes that have been successful take full account of best practice in participatory policy317
processes. Effective involvement of payment recipient groups throughout the scheme’s life cycle is318
essential for clear communication of the objectives as a precondition for payment, for risk319
management and conflict resolution (e.g., Stringer et al., 2006; Young et al., 2013; Reed et al.,320
2014). Bringing different types of knowledge together, framing situations for joint learning and321
planning in a collective manner, and engaging civil society organisations are all essential elements322
(Bruckmeier and Tovey, 2008; Meyer et al., 2016). Indeed, some of the RBP payments are made323
available as collective rewards (e.g. Zabel and Holm-Müller, 2008; de Lijster and Prager, 2012;324
Hiedanpää and Borgström, 2014). It is plausible that, in the future, the RBP approach will325
contribute to such socio-economic co-benefits as building community cohesion and multi-party326
networking around agricultural land-use.327
Biodiversity outcomes are not the only area where the RBP approach could potentially be applied.328
This is demonstrated by payment schemes worldwide for such outcomes as water quality, soil329
protection, flood and fire resilience (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). For example, the AES aimed at330
water quality in German federal states include a results-oriented requirement (keeping N surplus331
below a specified level) (Techen and Osterburg, 2011; Wezel et al., 2016). A scheme in Spain aims332
primarily at reducing the fire hazards associated with publicly owned forestland (Ruiz-Mirazo et al.,333




Given the range of situations in which RBP schemes are appropriate, there is clearly considerable338
potential to expand the use of the approach within the AES for the next CAP Rural Development339
programming period 2021–2028. Addition of a results-based scheme as an alternative to or340
replacement for an existing management-based schemes aimed at the same biodiversity objective,341
or adding a more demanding results-based top-up to existing management-based scheme342
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(contractually separate schemes) are relatively low-risk steps. However, when paying land343
managers for the ‘ecological goods and services’ they provide, limiting compensation to covering344
only the costs of production will remain a weak incentive, and does not reflect the risk involved. A345
true results-based approach should also reward the achievement of actual results, above the costs of346
their delivery, comparable to the profit margin of producing a market product (Reed et al., 2014).347
Practical solutions demonstrating how this principle can be implemented are still wanted.348
A need to redefine the development path for EU farming past the 2020s by focusing CAP funding349
on delivering outcomes and maximising the cost-effectiveness of the policy has been identified by350
several authors (e.g. Mann, 2017). Any change in policy implementation carries a cost that can be351
recovered only with time. Examples from the existing schemes provide a variety of working352
solutions to many of the challenges of designing and implementing the RBP approach. These do,353
however, come from a limited number of countries. The recent support by the European354
Commission for piloting the RBP approach in four countries with contrasting socio-economic355
contexts and experience with the approach through targeted funding is well timed1. Equally356
important is intensification of research efforts on the aspects critical to the effectiveness of the357
approach. These are particularly: development of suitable indicators of the defined biodiversity358
objective, the additionality of the approach in the long-term delivery of biodiversity outcomes,359
cultural change, and, finally, cost efficiency and its change over time. Does the approach channel360
support to the conservation of the most important  habitats and species and most important sites for361
them? Does it lead to enhancement of the existing biodiversity values over time compared to simply362
maintenance? Does it contribute to strengthening intrinsic motivations of participants? In what363
domains does the approach increase the awareness of farmers about the biodiversity on their land364
and their own role in its protection and production? And does this result in adaptive management365
and grassroots-level innovative solutions? Does it create links between farmers as providers of366
ecosystem services and the society as their consumer? How does cost efficiency develop with367
accumulated experience and widening implementation scales? How does cost efficiency of both368
results-based and management-based approaches for the same biodiversity objectives compare?369
Bridging sociological and ecological approaches will provide much needed monitoring of social co-370
benefits. Policy development for results-based approaches will also benefit from research into371
participatory modes and use of participatory modeling. In particular, focus on the process of social372
learning is necessary to orientate land managers and administration personnel alike toward results373
and experiment-driven environmental policy. The RBP schemes for biodiversity using the CAP and374
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The paper is based on the study, ‘Biodiversity protection through results based remuneration of380
ecological achievement’, commissioned by the European Commission (ENV.B.2/ETU/2013/0046).381
The full report and accompanying materials with detailed technical descriptions are available on382
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/rbaps/index_en.htm. IH and TB were supported by the Emil383
Aaltonen Foundation, Finland.384
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1 See the website rbaps.eu for further information386
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Table 1: Typology of the payment schemes for biodiversity on agricultural land in Europe. More specific information on all results-based560
schemes by type and country of implementation is in Supplement Table A.1.561
Scheme
type

















No management actions are
either specified or required
Solely biodiversity results measured
with indicators: single payment
threshold, stepped payment thresholds
or continuously variable payments
Species-rich grasslands in Brandenburg,
Germany: single payment for at least four
indicator plant species. Semi-natural
grassland in Lower Saxony, Germany:
payment for at least 4 indicator species and
top-up payment for additional 2 species.
Conservation performance payments in North
Sweden: payments according to the numbers






Holders have to undertake
some defined management
actions (or abstain from
certain activities) as a
baseline requirement of a
results-based contract
Single or stepped payment thresholds
payment is wholly dependent on
biodiversity results, measured using
one or more environmental indicators;
management actions have to be
undertaken as an unpaid condition
Species-rich grasslands in Baden-
Württemberg, Germany. Payment for at least
4 indicator plant species; additional






Similar to the above but the
contract is management-
based and the results element
is optional
Basic payment for management actions
and an extra (top-up) payment if
results are achieved
Pasturing contracts in Solothurn,
Switzerland: basic payment for management
requirements, in addition several steps for




















Holders only have to
undertake specified
management actions or
abstain from certain activities
Payments linked to management
actions having the conservation of
biodiversity as their primary purpose







Payment linked to defined farming
systems known or believed to produce
biodiversity benefits.
Schemes that promote organic farming or






Box 1: Essential steps in the life cycle of the results-based payment scheme (after Allen et al.,565
2014).566
I Exploration and feasibility assessment567
1. Building sufficient scientific and expert knowledge of the influence of farming practices on568
species and ecosystems within the area of the proposed scheme.569
2. Determining existence of biodiversity priorities, for which agricultural management is the570
key factor in ensuring the conservation of that biodiversity.571
3. Checking compatibility of the RBP scheme with national policy regulations, especially for572
payments coming from the CAP.573
4. Identifying potential sources of funding apart from the CAP.574
5. Identification of the civil society actors in areas that have a potential to contribute with575
context-specific knowledge and skills.576
577
II Design578
6. Setting a well-defined environmental objective that is sufficiently clear for land managers to579
understand and attractive to support (e.g. not conserving a noxious weed).580
7. Choosing and testing appropriate and reliable indicators of the defined environmental581
objective.582
8. ‘Tuning’ the scheme so that indicator thresholds are set at the right level to maintain or583
improve conservation condition, to encourage participation but prevent deterioration of the584
most biodiverse sites.585
9. Designing an effective payment structure that is tailored to the biodiversity objectives and586
indicator thresholds, their ecological importance and desired uptake, and in compliance with587
the EU and national rules.588
10. Developing a system of verifying results (not management) and controlling results-based589
payments that meet the EU requirements, and training the paying agency’s staff in its use.590
11. Developing an effective IT system that supports the design and operation of the scheme591
rather than distorting or limiting it.592
12. Developing a simple, objective, repeatable and unambiguous method of monitoring whether593





13. Using an appropriate pilot to test out scheme design and operation, to give farmers practical597
experience of a results-based approach and to develop people with expertise in, and598
enthusiasm for, results-based schemes and who can train others and act as advocates for this599
approach.600
14. Securing the positive engagement of land managers and other key stakeholders in scheme601
development, without diluting the environmental focus of the scheme.602
15. Using the ‘freedom to farm’ that results-based schemes allow to build land managers’603
acceptance of, and interest in, environmental land management while providing guidance on604
management necessary to bring about the desired outcomes.605
16. Providing high levels of facilitation, advice and support to applicants and contract holders.606
17. Encouraging innovation, self-help and mutual learning, and finding positive ways of607
harnessing the power of peer group pressure.608
18. Building up awareness about the scheme, also among the public.609
610
III Evaluation and Review611
19. Monitoring, evaluating, and refining the RBP scheme based on learning from its612




Table 2. The potential advantages of the results-based approach as compared to the conventional615
management-based payment delivery based on literature and experts interviewed in the current616
review.617
Potential advantages Specific references
Clearer link between payment and biodiversity achievement
and thus the transaction between the state and farmer
Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010;
Zabel and Roe, 2009; Osbeck
et al., 2013
Effective achievement of an environmental objective that
depends on a complex set of farm practices
Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010;
Prince et al., 2012
Making the ‘production’ of biodiversity more an integral part of
the farming system and farm business, not just another set of
land management ‘rules’ to be followed
Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010;
Burton and Schwarz, 2013;
Russi et al., 2016
Giving farmers the opportunity to use their management skills,
professional judgement and knowledge of the farm
Haaren and Bathke 2008;
Klimek et al., 2008; Osbeck et
al., 2013
Providing payment recipients with management flexibility De Sainte Marie, 2014;
Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010;
Russi et al., 2016
Farmers/land managers being encouraged to take responsibility
for and to ‘own’ the biodiversity results
Zabel and Holm-Müller, 2008;
Magda et al., 2015
More easily meeting the strengthened EU requirements for
verification of AES payments under the 2014-2020 CAP
Allen et al., 2014
Cutting ‘deadweight’ from schemes via a built-in incentive for
farmers to select only the land where the biodiversity results are
additional to the baseline
Burton and Schwarz, 2013;
Birge et al., 2017
More straightforward verification and control Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010;
Groth, 2009; Russi et al., 2016
Operationalising the learning component of adaptive
management for all actors: increasing the awareness of land
managers about the biodiversity on their land, and contributing
Magda et al., 2015; Fleury et
al., 2015; Russi et al., 2016
25
25
to public recognition of farmers’ role in supporting
biodiversity; changing farmer attitudes towards conservation
Creating or strengthening links among different actors Haaren and Bathke 2008;
Zabel et al., 2014; Magda et





Figure 1. Results-based payment schemes for biodiversity on agricultural land in Europe, number of620
peer-reviewed publications that focus on specific results-based payment schemes (but not generally621
describing the results-based approach) and the cumulative number of countries of the EU, Norway622




Appendix Table A.1. Existing and discontinued results-based payment schemes and their prototype assessments for biodiversity in agricultural
environments in Europe, listed by country. Pure results-based and hybrid refer to the typology proposed here (Table 1). Description of most of
the schemes’ design can be found on the site Farming for Biodiversity: The results-based agri-environment-climate schemes (RBAPS- project)
















Results-based nature conservation plan - Pilot project
leaflet. Available at: http://static.suske.at.
FI Sami
Reindeer area





Hiedanpää and Borgström, 2014; Suvantola, 2013
FR 2007 Flowering Meadows
Scheme (HERBE_07)
Species-rich grasslands
Hybrid RBAPS- project database
Fleury et al., 2015; Magda et al., 2015; De Sainte Marie,
2014.
RBAPS- site (includes a blog posting, video and conference
presentation)





















Hybrid RBAPS- project database






Hybrid RBAPS- project database.





Hybrid RBAPS- project database
Schemes similar to those in Baden-Württemberg and
Rheinland-Pfalz were available in the agri-environmental
programming period for 2007-2013:
- Niedersachsen & Bremen,
- Rheinland-Pfalz,
- Thüringen





Hybrid RBAPS- project database
Schemes similar to those in Baden-Württemberg and
Rheinland-Pfalz introduced to the agri-environmental






1993 Harrier nest protection in
arable fields scheme
Hybrid RBAPS- project database
Run by association Arbeitsgemeinschaft Biologischer
Umweltschutz im Kreis Soest e.V.
DE Bayern 1999 Harrier nest protection in
arable fields scheme
Hybrid RBAPS- project database
Similar to Nordrhein-Westfalen scheme.
DE, various
federal states
2007 German orchard schemes
(~ 8 schemes)
Hybrid RBAPS- project database
29
29
Schemes with per-tree payments for traditional orchards
under the AES are available in most German federal states.
For example, in the period of 2007-2013:
- Bayern: Streuobst Anbau (KULAP A45);
- Brandenburg & Berlin: A5‚ Pflege von Streuobstwiesen‘;
- Nordrhein-Westfalen: Vertragsnaturschutz
Streuobstwiesenförderung (Paket 4301 und 4302;
- Rheinland-Pfalz: PAULa Vertragsnaturschutz Streuobst.
DE Bremen 2005 Grassland bird protection
scheme
Hybrid RBAPS- project database




1997 Grassland bird protection
scheme
Hybrid
IE 2010 Burren Farming for
Conservation Programme
Hybrid RBAPS- project database
RBAPS- site (includes a video).
Burren Programme http://burrenprogramme.com/
BurrenLIFE - Farming for conservation in the Burren.
LIFE04 NAT/IE/000125
National Parks and Wildlife Service. Burren Life
Programme. https://www.npws.ie/research-projects/burren-
life-programme
NL 2004 Meadow bird agreements Hybrid Collective
payments
RBAPS- project database
RBAPS-site (includes a video and conference presentation).
de Lijster and Prager, 2012
NL 1993 Breeding meadow birds -
per clutch trial scheme
Pure results-
based
Discontinued RBAPS- project database
Musters et al., 2001; de Lijster and Prager, 2012; Verhulst
et al., 2007; Kohler et al., 2007*
NL 2000 Meadow Bird Agreements
scheme
Hybrid Changed in 2004
and a new version
RBAPS- project database







Environmental Assessment Agency, 2007*
NL 2000 Species-rich grassland
scheme
Hybrid Changed in 2004







Kohler et al., 2007*




Hybrid RBAPS- project database











RBAPS- site (includes a video)
Zabel et al., 2014; Zabel and Roe, 2009; Zabel A and
Holm-Müller, 2008
CH Solothurn 1995 Pastures in Canton
Solothurn,
Hybrid RBAPS- project database
Albrecht et al., 2007*; Knop et al., 2006*; Kohler et al.,
2007*; Schwab et al., 2002*




















Buckingham et al., 1998*; Schwarz and Morkvenas, 2012*
Pilots and prototype assessments
ES, Navarra
region
2016 Perennial crops of






































on the type of
management that








2017 Species rich hay meadow,
Habitat for breeding
waders, Winter bird food,
Pollen and nectar plants
Pure results-
based
Introduced into four existing agri-environment scheme
options. Report available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/results-based-
agri-environment-payment-scheme-rbaps-pilot-study-in-
england (Last accessed 23.03.2017)










Prototype, arable weeds Pure results-
based
Auctioning Bertke et al., 2005*; Ulber et al., 2010*; Ulber et al., 2011.
32
32
FI 2015 Prototype, species-rich
fallows
Hybrid Birge et al., 2017
SE 2013 Prototype, landscape Hasund, 2013
UK England 2013 Ex ante evaluation Schroeder et al., 2013
1 If abbreviated, references are available in the Reference list of the main document or in the list below (marked with *). Sources in national languages in grey
literature (e.g., reports and scheme documentation) are listed as Supplement Table A.2.
* Full references:
The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2007) Executive summary of the ecological evaluation of Nature Conservation Schemes run under the
Stewardship Programme and the Dutch National Forest Service 2000-2006.
Kohler F, Verhulst J, Knop E, Herzog F and Kleijn D (2007) Indirect effects of grassland extensification schemes on pollinators in two contrasting European
countries. Biol Conserv 135: 302–307
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Schwab A, Dubois D, Fried P M and Edwards P J (2002) Estimating the biodiversity of hay meadows in north-eastern Switzerland on the basis of vegetation
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Buckingham H, Chapman J and Newman R (1998) Meadows beyond the Millennium: The future for Hay Meadows in the Peak District National Park.
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Schwarz G and Morkvenas Z (2012) Review of outcome based agri-environmental payments and guidelines for the practical implementation of a pilot scheme
in Lithuania. Baltic Compass project.
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Appendix A.2. Grey literature sources in national languages for the existing and discontinued results-based payment schemes for biodiversity in
agricultural environments in Europe, listed by country.
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